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Qualifying Examinations Completed:
2022 (Oral): Industrial Organization, International Trade

Dissertation Title: *Essays on Digital and International Labor Markets*

Committee:
Professor Philip Haile (Chair)
Professor Joseph Altonji
Professor Steven Berry
Professor Charles Hodgson

Education:
Ph.D., Economics, Yale University, 2026 (expected)
M.Phil., Economics, Yale University, 2024
M.A., Economics, Yale University, 2023
B.A., Economics and Mathematics, *magna cum laude*, Yale University, 2020

Fellowships, Honors and Awards:
Carl Arvid Anderson Prize Fellowship, Yale University, 2024-2025
Slyff Fellowship, Yale University, 2022-2023
Doctoral Fellowship and Cowles Foundation Fellowship, Yale University, 2020-2026

Research Grants:
Slyff Research Award, Yale Economic Growth Center
Research Grant, Cowles Foundation at Yale University

Teaching Experience:
Spring 2026 (anticipated), Class TBD

Spring 2024, Teaching Assistant to Prof. Philip Haile, Firms, Markets, and Competition (Undergraduate), Yale University

Fall 2023, Teaching Assistant to Evangelia Chalioti, Intermediate Microeconomics (Undergraduate), Yale University

Research Experience:

Research Assistant to Prof. Costas Arkolakis, Yale University, 2021-2023

Research Assistant to Prof. Johannes Hörner, Yale University, 2018

Working Papers:

"Bidding for Reputation" (November 2025), *Job Market Paper*

"Signaling in the Age of AI: Evidence from Cover Letters" with Gabriel Dias and Justin Ye (September 2025)

*"*The Global Market for White-Collar Jobs" with Samuel Solomon (January 2025)

Seminar and Conference Presentations:

2025: MPWZ-CEPR Text-as-Data Workshop

2024: Stanford Remote Work Conference

Referee Service:

American Economic Review, Journal of International Economics

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References:

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Dissertation Abstract

I study digital and international labor markets using novel data and empirical tools from industrial organization and labor economics.

Bidding for Reputation [Job Market Paper]

Reputation is often important in markets for experience goods. New sellers commonly invest in reputation by offering introductory pricing or other incentives. By encouraging buyers to try new sellers, these investments generate information externalities for future buyers while diverting business from other sellers.

In this paper, I study reputation investment behavior in the context of Freelancer.com, a large online labor platform where international workers compete in auctions for short-term jobs. Workers build reputation through public employer reviews and accumulate human capital through experience. The platform charges a commission on each transaction, which gives it an incentive to adopt policies that enhance overall market efficiency.

Using proprietary data covering three million wage bids, I show that employers value worker reputation and experience, and that new workers initially bid low wages but raise their bids after obtaining experience and reviews. I estimate a dynamic equilibrium auction model. The model includes symmetric Bayesian learning about worker quality and human capital accumulation. Employers make discrete choices that trade off wages and expected productivity, while forward-looking workers bid anticipating the effects of reputation and experience on future payoffs. I extend expectation–maximization techniques for estimating dynamic games with unobserved heterogeneity to incorporate exchange rates as instrumental variables.

Compared to a counterfactual with bidding based only on immediate payoffs, forward-looking bidding increases the equilibrium number of reviewed workers by 52% and quadruples the number of matches on the platform. However, workers' investments remain below the social optimum. The socially optimal platform-funded subsidy for hiring new workers would raise total surplus by 22% while increasing platform profit. The subsidy level that maximizes platform profit is lower, but achieves 80% of the total surplus gain. Results show that workers' optimal investment behavior, combined with a profitable platform subsidy, comes close to achieving the social optimum.

Signaling in the Age of AI: Evidence from Cover Letters, with Gabriel Dias and Justin Ye

We study the impact of generative AI on labor market signaling using the introduction of an AI-powered cover letter writing tool on a large online labor platform. Our data track both access to the tool and usage at the application level. Difference-in-differences estimates show that access to the tool increased textual alignment between cover letters and job posts and raised callback rates. Time spent editing AI-generated cover letter drafts is positively correlated with hiring success. After the tool's introduction, the correlation between cover letters' textual alignment and callbacks fell by 51%, consistent with what theory predicts if the AI technology reduces the signal content

of cover letters. In response, employers shifted toward alternative signals, including workers' prior work histories.

The Global Market for White-Collar Jobs, with Samuel Solomon

We study cross-country remote work using data on 200,000 white-collar workers employed by 20,000 firms from the global human resources company Deel. Three main facts emerge. First, countries specialize in occupations consistent with their comparative advantages in math and language skills. Second, international remote hiring features narrower cross-country wage disparities than traditional domestic hiring, with sorting of international workers across firms accounting for a larger share of the wage gap than within-firm pay differences. Third, by linking workers and firms across borders, global remote work generates a median annual surplus of $52,480 per contract compared to domestic hiring. Workers from wealthier countries capture a larger share of this surplus, though their proportional gains are smaller.